We set up an endogenous growth model with vertical innovations in which the use of a non-renewable resource within the production process generates a flow of pollution.
Introduction
The question concerning the possibility -as well as the optimality-of long-term growth in the presence of a finite stock of resources has been widely studied in the literature. The two main types of models that have been used to assess this problem, namely Ramsey-type growth models (where we can quote Stiglitz (1974) , Garg and Sweeney (1978) or Dasgupta and Heal (1979) ) and the endogenous growth models (Schou (1996) , Aghion and Howitt (1998) , Scholz and Ziemes (1999) , Barbier (1999) or Grimaud and Rouge (2003) ), have generally shown that long term growth is feasible, desirable and that it is attainable at equilibrium under certain technological conditions (and given that, within the second type of models, incentive policies for research are implemented).
Indeed, the non-renewable character of some of the resource stocks that are consumed within an economy is no longer considered to be a major problem, and the Club of Rome's worries seem to be, at least partly, unjustified. Instead, environmental quality and its deterioration by the different types of pollution issued from human activity have slowly become the major concern both for public opinion and within the scientific community. Hence, numerous authors have studied the compatibility between long-term economic development and the protection of the environment. Articles that survey the literature on this subject include van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991) who study the issue using Ramsey-type models, and Smulders (1995 and as well as Beltratti (1996) who do the same within an endogenous growth framework.
Simultaneously, certain countries became aware of the potential dangers arising from the increase of polluting emissions at a global scale. World summits began to take place, where nations attempted to reach some degree of co-ordination about abatement policies for these global emissions. A UN framework convention concerning the reduction of atmospheric CO 2 emissions (the main greenhouse gas) as well as of other greenhouse gases was adopted by 160 countries at the Earth Summit in Rio (in May 1992). The Kyoto Conference (December 1997) managed to adopt a protocol 1 for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions spanning several decades, and the Johannesburg Conference (August 2002) on sustainable development underlined the imperative character of such measures. Indeed, whereas 96% of atmospheric CO 2 is of "natural" origin and only 4% originates from human activity, the latter proportion has not ceased to increase. Carbon dioxide emissions have been multiplied by a factor of 17 between 1890 and 1990. Yet, despite that 70 to 75% of these emissions are caused by the combustion of fossil fuels (coal and hydrocarbons), most of the models that study the "growth-environment" problem, and specially those that focus on greenhouse gas polluting emissions, neglect the fact that non-renewable resources are the source of that kind of pollution. At the same time, the above-cited literature on growth in the presence of non-renewable resources fails to incorporate the effects of the pollution that is generated through their use.
In view of the facts that we have briefly recalled, it appears that a synthesis of the two approaches (growth-environment and growth-non renewable resources) is called for.
Some authors have already pointed out the fact that part of the observed polluting emissions proceed from the consumption of non-renewable natural resources.
Kolstad and Krautkraemer (1993) survey that literature and underline the (mostly technical) complexity of the problem posed. More recently, Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) , and then Tahvonen (1997) studied the optimal paths arising from the use of a polluting resource when an alternative non-polluting technology is available -the main differences lie within the cost structure. Schou (2000 and studies Lucas and Romer-type growth models when the use of a non-renewable resource creates a negative externality that affects either technology (erosion, rust, workers' health) or households' welfare. In both cases, he concludes that, at equilibrium, a specific environmental policy is not necessary in order to implement the optimum. The general problem's key issue is that using the resource (hence extracting it) entails pollution. The resource is thus a dirty input, as opposed to work or knowledge.
Therefore, the questions are not only "at what rate should the finite resource stock be extracted?" or "how to share a finite stock of resource among an infinite number of generations?" but we must now add the following ones: "at what rate should a finite stock of pollution be emitted?" or even "how should a finite stock of pollution be shared among an infinite number of generations?" By taking into account the characteristic of the resource to be the pollutant, we introduce a new dimension to concentration (see Chakravorty, Roumasset and Tse (1997) ).
the problem: the choice of a resource extraction path now implies the choice of a pollution path.
In the present article, we consider that the use of a non-renewable natural resource in the production process generates a flow of pollution. The environmental quality is a stock whose evolution through time depends negatively upon this flow of pollution and positively upon its own auto-regenerative capacity. Moreover, in addition to instantaneous consumption, this flow is an argument of the utility function. In fact, we employ a non-separable utility function (like, e.g. Gradus et
Smulders (1993)) and we will see that this choice conveys important modifications to the Ramsey-Keynes condition. Indeed, the consumption growth rate depends on the interest rate, but also on the environmental quality's growth rate (or equivalently, on the resource's extraction rate). We set up an endogenous growth model within which the source of growth is vertical innovation (that is, an enhancement in knowledge) over a continuum of sectors. Contrarily to that done by Grossman and Helpman (1991) In order to correct the distortion introduced by the pollution that is generated from the use of the resource, we implement an environmental policy that consists in an emission of pollution rights. The latter allows us to remain consistent with respect to the above mentioned observations (the Kyoto protocol). An economic policy is therefore the announcement to the market of a profile of permits issued by the government; this automatically determines the pollution profile and thus the extraction of the resource. Note right away that, due to the modification of the above cited Ramsey-Keynes condition, the policy will have, outside of general equilibrium, direct effects on households' saving behaviour and, therefore, upon on the consumption growth rate. Additionally, it will have a profound and complex impact on the economy at general equilibrium, since it generates a profile of prices of permits that affects equilibrium variables (R&D effort, economic growth...) precisely via the price channel. In particular, we show that the policy instrument is not the price of the permits themselves (this only allows a reallocation of income among sectors) but rather its dynamics. Furthermore, we prove that, within our model, a more stringent environmental policy entails an increased R&D effort, if preference for environmental quality is high enough across society; moreover, instead of slowing down the economy, it favours growth, something which can be interpreted as a possible justification for Porter and Van der Linde's (1995) hypothesis.
In the second section of this article, we introduce the model and we completely characterise the equilibrium in section 3. In the fourth section we then study the effects of the environmental policy by exhaustively presenting all the subsequent modifications to equilibrium arising from the implementation of that policy. The final section draws conclusions.
The model
At each time t, a quantity Y t of consumption good is produced according to the following technology:
where L Y t is the amount of labour devoted to production, B t is the total knowledge and R t is the flow of non-renewable resource used within the production process. Let us now make the two following assumptions. First, the Poisson arrival rate of vertical innovations in any sector i is
where λ is a parameter indicating the productivity of research, and L RDit is the amount of labor devoted to R&D in sector i. Second, denoting by τ (i) the number of innovations in sector i (τ (i) = 1, 2, ...), we assume that when an innovation occurs in this sector, the increase in knowledge is given by
2 See for instance Jones (2003) who uses several models of this type in his survey. A more complete presentation of the methodology used here is given in Grimaud (2002) .
where B t(τ (i)) is the total level of knowledge when the level of knowledge is B τ (i)
in sector i. As suggested by Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch 3) for instance, this assumption is a formalization of the intersectoral spillovers, that is to say the fact that new technologies "diffuse gradually, through a process in which one sector gets ideas from the research and experience of others" (p 85). It simply says that the increase in knowledge in sector i, B τ +1(i) − B τ (i) , is a linear function of total knowledge B t(τ (i)) . It is easy to verify that it leads to a very simple law of motion of the average knowledge in sector i: E(Ḃ it ) = λσL RDit B t (see Appendix A1). Since
where
L RDit di is the total amount of labor devoted to research.
Note that this is only a technical relation ; we do not need L RDi = L RDj for all i, j ∈ [0; 1], as for instance in Aghion-Howitt model.
As we mentioned it before, labor is used by the production sector (L Y t ) and by the research sector (L RDt ). We assume that the total flow of labor supply is fixed, and we normalize it to one. Thus, at each time t,we have
The resource is extracted from an initial finite stock S 0 , and we have the standard resource stock law of motion:Ṡ
Last, the utility function of the infinitely lived representative agent is
where ρ is a positive rate of time preference. Moreover
that is, the whole production flow is consumed by the household; and E t is, as in Aghion-Howitt (1998 (p 157)), a negative variable measuring the difference between the actual quality of the environment and its upper limit (reached if all pollution were to cease indefinitely). We assume that the law of motion of E t is 3 E t = −P t − φE t , with φ > 0
P t being the flow of pollution generated by the natural resource use within the production process. Thus E is depleted over time by pollution but it has its own regeneration capacities.
Note that, for all C > 0 and E < 0, we have (we denote by U x the derivative of the utility function relative to any variable x): U C > 0, U CC < 0 and U E > 0.
For U EE to be negative (as for the standard utility function used by Aghion-Howitt (1998) for example) we need
which implies ε > 1. Moreover, we also have
which is negative (since 1 − ε is negative).
Equilibrium
The price of good Y is normalized to one, and w t , p Rt and r t are, respectively, the wage, the resource price, and the interest rate on a perfect financial market. On this market, R&D firms sell bonds to the households. We denote by D t the stock of bonds at time t.
In order to eliminate the market failure arising from the fact that firms do not take into account the negative externality due to the use of the non-renewable resource within the production process , i.e., pollution, we use a policy tool: pollution permits. At each time t, authorities allocate a quantity Q t of tradeable permits to the firms producing the consumption good which trade them on a perfectly competitive market at price q t .
Behaviour of agents Consumption good sector:
At each time t, the profit of the representative firm 4 is
where p Rt q t P t is the value of permits bought by the firm, and p Rt q t Q t corresponds to its initial endowments. This production function can be rewritten as follows
with, using (8), θ t = γq t + 1. We can interpret p Rt θ t as the global cost of one unit of resource: p Rt is paid to the resource owner and p Rt γq t is paid to the permits owners.
Differenciating π Y t with respect to L Y t and R t , and equating to zero, gives the two following first order conditions:
( 1 1 ) R&D sector:
Knowledge is used by two sectors: the consumption good sector and the R&D sector. As we mentioned above, knowledge is not embodied inside intermediate goods, thus it cannot be financed by the profits made on the sale of these goods.
We suppose here that it is directly financed. Therefore we formalize ideas already expressed by authors like Arrow (1962) , Scotchmer (1991) or Dasgupta et al. (1996) .
For instance, Dasgupta et al. write "a possible scheme is for society to grant intellectual property rights to private producers for their discoveries, and permit them to charge (possibly differential) fees for their use by others. This creates private markets for knowledge. Patents and copyrights protections are means of enforcing intellectual property rights. It is as well to note that, in this scheme the producer (or owner) of a piece of information should ideally set different prices for differ- 4 For computational convenience, we consider one unique firm. We could also consider a desagregated sector with n firms whose production function would be
In this case, we would denote by Q jt the quantity of permits issued to firm j, with Σ n j=1 Q jt = Q t for all t. The results would not be modified. ent buyers, because different buyers typically value the information differently. In economics, these variegated prices are called Lindahl prices". Nonetheless, as the sectors using knowledge exhibit constant returns to scale in the private goods, their profits are nil. Thus we assume that the government subsidies the consumption good sector and the R&D sector to buy knowledge.
Remark: This type of decentralization defines an equilibrium that is a benchmark. The main interest of designing such an equilibrium is that it allows us to focus on one single distorsion: the one caused by pollution. Note that, as seen above, this leads to assume that the governement finances partially R&D. However, it is possible, assuming that the two sectors using innovations (final sector and R&D sector) are imperfectly competitive, to construct an equilibrium in which R&D is entirely and privately financed by these sectors (we find a similar equilibrium path in this case).
At each time t, the value of one unit of knowledge is:
where v t is the sum of the willingnesses to pay for one unit of knowledge of the homogeneous good sector (v Y t ) and the R&D sector (v
The expected profit on knowledge at t is 5 :
This leads to the following free entry condition:
Remark: Here also we could desagregate this sector into a large number of firms, but the results would not be changed.
From (9), (13), (14) and (10) we have:
5 The way we present the calculations is a shortness; a more complete presentation is given in appendix A2. The results are the same. and v
Resource sector:
On the competitive natural resource market, the maximization of the profit func-
Representative household:
At each time t, the representative household maximizes the utility function
whereḊ t is lendings at t, and T t is a lump-sum tax levied by the government to finance research. This maximization leads to the following condition:
( 1 8 ) Note that, for a given r, a decrease inĖ/E causes a decrease inĊ/C since 1 − ε < 0 (this comes from U EE < 0 (see section 2)). At steady-state, where all growth rates are constant,Ė/E =Ṙ/R =Ṗ /P < 0 (dividing each hand side of equation (7) by E t yields this result 6 ). Therefore, a decrease in g E (we denote by g x the growth rate of any variable x) means more pollution, i.e. a worse environment, today (and thus less pollution tomorrow, as the pollution stock is finite). In order to compensate this disutility, the household consumes more today (and less tomorrow);
that is why the growth rate of consumption decreases (see Figure 1) . Moreover, the higher ε, the higher is the decrease in g C due to a given decrease in g E . This comes from the fact that a high ε means that the household does not like variations on his utility path (i.e. the higher ε, the more the household is keen on uniform utility path). Thus the compensation in terms of present consumption for a initial disutility caused by a worse environment today is maximum.
Observe that this effect of g E on g C is a direct consequence of the non-separability of the utility function (see (5)). We see later that, at general equilibrium, it is ) / ( Figure 1 : Effect of a change in g E = g R on g C , for a given r widened by a decrease in r.
Government:
The government's budget constraint is
where s 
Characterization of the equilibrium
Now we give a complete description of the general equilibrium of this economy.
Moreover we focus on the study of steady-state paths, i.e., on paths along which the growth rate of any variable is constant, as mentioned above. 7 We assume here that the government possesses all the information and thus can perfectly determine v Y and v RD . Of course this is just a benchmark and informational asymmetries could be introduced.
Proposition 1 A steady-state equilibrium is a set of quantities and growth rates that take the following values (we drop time subscripts for notational convenience):
The prices are given in Appendix B.
Remark: At the steady-state equilibrium, given S 0 and B 0 , the initial quantities
) (dividing each side of (7) yields this result) and at each time t we have x t = x 0 e gxt for any variable x.
Basically, equation (25) shows how the intertemporal path of permits issued by the government (g Q ), determines the growth rate of the permits price: we analyze this relation later in the analysis (see section 4.2). Once g Q , and thus g θ , are set, equations (20) and (21) explain how labour is allocated between research and production. Then, (22) gives the growth of knowledge, and (23) at the same time gives the extraction path of the resource and the evolution of environmental quality. Finally, equation (24) determines the growth of production and thus the growth of consumption.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Existence of interior equilibrium
Now we study the equilibrium path we just described, in the absence of any environmental policy (i.e. q t = 0).
We need 0 < L RD < 1, and g R < 0 to have a solution. Proposition 1 shows that there exist parameter values for which these conditions are not fulfilled. We are thus looking for the set of parameter values in which these conditions are together fulfilled, in particular in order to avoid corner solutions (with, for example, no research at equilibrium). To do so, we use equations (20) and (23) . The set is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 An interior equilibrium exists if and only if
ρ < (λσν/α)((α + ω)(1 − ε) + ε).
In the case where ω > 1 − α, the condition ε < (α + ω)/(α + ω − 1) needs also to be fulfilled.
Environmental policy 4.1 An exhaustive description of the decentralized equilibrium with tradeable permits
Now we give a complete description of the general equilibrium at steady-state; in particular, we show how equilibrium flows are modified by the environmental policy.
Remember that, at each time t, the government issues a quantity Q t of permits, and thus sets the flow P t (= Q t ) of pollution, and the resource extraction R t (= Q t /γ). As we showed in Proposition 1, this environmental policy simultaneously has an impact on the set of variables of the economy. In order to have an exhaustive description of these effects, let us come back to the behaviour of the agents and gather the results in a table depicting the general equilibrium of the economy. First, let us describe the operations of each agent at each time t (each flow is divided by Y t ).
• Consumption good sector (11)). Note that, as mentioned above in the comments on (9), the payment for the resource can be decomposed in two parts:
-payment to the resource sector:
-payments to the representative firm itself (value of permits):
An essential feature of the equilibrium is that a modification in the level of the prices of the permits θ has no effect on the total payment for the resource, and the initial permits endowments ((1 − α)(θ − 1)/θ).
• R&D sector
Revenues:
• Resource sector
Since there are no extraction costs, the resource sector profit is given by the payment coming from the consumption good sector. We assume that this profit is distributed to the households.
Expenditures: profit (p R R/Y = (1− α)/θ, since there are no extraction costs).
Revenues: resource (p R R/Y = (1 − α)/θ, see equation (11)).
• Households
see equation (19) and above). (10)); profits issued from the resource sector (p R R/Y = (1 − α)/θ, see equation (11) and above (resource sector));
interests (rD/Y = αg Y /λσL Y + ν, see above (R&D sector)).
• Government
. (19)). Table 1 depicts the flows per unit of output. We give expenditures and revenues for each agent: H is for household, CG for consumption good sector, RD for R&D sector, R for resource sector and G for government.
EXPENDITURES REVENUES We denote
Effects of the environmental policy
First of all, observe that no environmental policy, that is, q t = 0, and thus θ t = 1, corresponds to to the case where a = 0 in Table 1 . Then the permits row disappears, and the government subsidizes the whole payment for knowledge of consumption good sector.
In fact, an environmental policy corresponds here to a path {Q t } +∞ t=0 , that is, at steady-state, to a couple {Q 0 , g Q } . This policy then generates a particular path of permit prices, that is, a profile of θ t -remember that p Rt θ t can be seen as the generalized cost of one unit of resource, or equivalently, the unit price which embodies the value of permits. Equations (25) and (23) shows that g θ is negative if and only if g Q is higher than g R , i.e. than the equilibrium value of the extraction growth rate in the absence of any environmental policy (see Figure 2 ). More generally, we have ∂g θ /∂g Q < 0 (see (25) ). We will focus now on the case of an initial decrease in pollution emissions, imposed by the government. This corresponds to the first case in Figure 2 . As we said, at steady-state, this means choosing g Q > g R , i.e. a slower extraction of the resource 8 . Since the basic transmission channel of the environmental policy is the change in the path of permits prices, we now study the effects of changes in g θ .
Let us consider an increase in g Q (when an environmental policy is implemented, or or when policy measures become more stringent). As we showed it, this implies a decrease in g θ . We get the two following propositions.
Proposition 3 An increase in g Q , that is, a decrease in g θ , leads to a decrease in L RD , and thus in g B , if and only if ω < 1 − α.
Proof. Differentiating (20) with respect to g θ yields the result (remember that ε > 1).
Let us consider the limit case where ω = 0. In this case, households are indifferent to their environment, thus they react as in the non-polluting resource standard case (see Stiglitz (1974) , or Schou (1996) ). An increase in g Q , implies an initial decrease in the extraction flows. Thus, if nothing else is changed, the production flows for the first generations will get lower. The only way to avoid such a decrease in current consumptions, and thus to avoid this virtual disutility (for a given ρ), is to increase the amount of another input: labor devoted to production. For this reason, labor devoted to research decreases, and we get a lower growth rate of knowledge.
If ω is high, households give a strong value to their environment. Then, the initial decrease in consumptions (due to the decrease in production caused by a less intense resource use) leads to a virtual disutility that can be totally offset by the virtual utility gain due to a cleaner environment. We can also consider the case where L Y can even diminish, and thus L RD increase, because households are very glad to see their environment improved.
Thus, a more stringent environmental policy can lead to higher efforts in research if households value environment a lot.
Proposition 4 An increase in g Q , that is, a decrease in g θ , entails an increase in g Y : a more stringent environmental policy favours growth.
Proof. Differentiating (24) with respect to g θ yields the result.
Yet we showed in section 3.1 the partial equilibrium positive effect of g E (= g Q ) on g C (= g Y ). Now, we have a general equilibrium effect that strengthens this run, then the resource stock may not be entirely exhausted in the long run. Thus pollution would not necessarily increase for future generations. This point goes beyond the scope of our analysis.
one. We can easily see that g pR gets higher values as g θ is getting lower. Moreover, we know, by assumption, that g R is increasing, i.e., that initially less ressource is extracted, and more in the far future. Thus the profile of instantaneous profits for the resource sector, {p Rt R t } +∞ t=0 , is modified. In fact, this sector will make lower profits today, and higher profits tomorrow. This means lower revenues today for the households, and higher revenues in the future. Thus, ceteris paribus, the household needs to save less, and that explains why r increases. This higher interest rate leads to more growth. Thus, as we say it in the proposition, in the present model, the environmental policy promotes growth. This can also be interpreted in light of arguments of Porter and Van der Linde (1995).
Conclusion
The main objective of this paper was to study the effects of an environmental policy in a general equilibrium framework with the following main characteristics:
-the use of a non-renewable resource within the production process generates a flow of pollution that affects negatively the evolution of the environmental stock, -households are characterized by a non-separable utility function whose arguments are consumption and the stock of environment, -authorities use tradeable pollution permits in order to control the emissions, -we use an endogenous growth framework in which innovations are vertical, and knowledge is not embodied inside intermediate goods.
We describe exhaustively the general equilibrium and we show how each flow is affected by the environmental policy. Moreover, we prove that the price level of permits does not matter; it is the growth rate of this price that is the key channel of transmission of this policy. Finally, we show that implementing an environmental policy (or making it more stringent) leads to more (respectively less) efforts in research when households value their environment a lot (resp. a little). In all cases, this favours growth. Appendix A. Research sector A1. Consider an time interval (t, t+∆t). If knowledge in sector i is B it at time t, its value at t + ∆t is a random variable B it+∆t which can take two values: B it+∆t = B it + σB t with probability λL RDit ∆t (one innovation during the time interval), and B it with probability 1 − λL RDit ∆t (no innovation). One gets E(B it+∆t ) = (B it + σB t )λL RDit ∆t + B it (1 − λL RDit ∆t) = B it + λσL RDit B t ∆t. If ∆t tends to zero, we have
Recall that, since B t = R 1 0 B it di, we have on averagė
(see equation (2) in the main text).
A2. The R&D firm in sector i maximizes the sum of present values of current
0 rudu + χ t λσL RDit B t , where χ t is the costate variable. The condition ∂H/∂L RDit = 0 leads to
The condition ∂H/∂B it = −χ t leads to
Remark 1: Different formulation of (26) Integrating (27) 
t r u du ds the value at t of one unit of knowledge (see (12) in the main text). Then we have χ t = V t e − R t 0 r u du : it is the present value of V t at 0. Finally, (26) can be rewritten w t = V t λσB t , that is, exactly condition (14). 
B. Computation of the equilibrium
• At steady-state, differentiating (1) with respect to time gives
Using (6), (2), (18) and the fact that g E = g R , as we show it in section 3.1, we
which is a first relation between g R , r and L RD (or, equivalently g θ , r and L RD ).
• Differentiating (11) with respect to time yields
This relation, together with (17), gives
which is a second relation between g R , r and L RD (or, equivalently g θ , r and L RD ).
• Differentiating (14) with respect to time, we geṫ
From (10), we know that g w = g Y , thus (31) and (28) givė
Moreover, equation (12), (15) and (16) Equations (32), (2) and (33) provide us a third relation between g R , r and L RD (or, equivalently g θ , r and L RD ):
(1 − α)g R = (λσν/α)(1 − α)L RD − (λσν/α) + r.
( 3 4 ) (29), (30) and (34) give the values of g R , r and L RD at the steady-state equilibrium. Moreover, using (2) and (3), we get g B and L Y .
The prices are:
where R t = −S 0 g R e g R t and B t = B 0 e g B t .
C. Revenues and expenditures in the research sector 
